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Abstract
This paper looks at the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to EU policy-
making. This new mode of governance has been developed over the last decade and has received 
considerable attention in the literature. However, much of this writing fails to put the OMC into the 
broader context of EMU; in contrast, this paper links the Amsterdam employment title to the prior 
Maastricht decision to form a monetary union. It seeks to contribute to the literature on European 
integration in two ways: First, this paper offers three refinements to Pierson's historical 
institutionalist account of European integration. Second, it thus provides an alternative to 
functional explanations of the OMC. In brief the argument is that a conservative-liberal coalition at 
Maastricht created hard law in fiscal and monetary policy to constrain its successors, while the 
social democratic majority at Amsterdam relied on soft law to promote its goals in employment and 
social policy. While the former effectively limited later policy-choices, the latter largely avoids 
sovereignty losses for national governments. The contents of the Employment Title were 
determined by EMU, its form – the OMC – by social democratic reluctance to transfer power to the 
EU.
Kurzfassung
Das Papier untersucht die Einführung der Offenen Methode der Koordinierung (OMK) in der 
Europäischen Union. Dieses neue Politikinstrument ist in den letzten zehn Jahren als Alternative 
zur Gemeinschaftsmethode entstanden und hat in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur viel 
Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Allerdings wird der Zusammenhang seiner Einführung mit der 
Europäischen Währungsunion oft nur kursorisch bemerkt, ohne ihm ausführlich nachzugehen. 
Dieses Papier möchte im Gegensatz dazu genau auf diesen Zusammenhang aufmerksam machen, 
um auf zwei Arten zum Forschungsstand beizutragen: Ersten fügt der theoretische Teil drei 
Elemente zu Piersons historisch-institutionalistischer Analyse der Europäischen Integration hinzu. 
Zweitens soll mit Hilfe des modifizierten historisch-institutionalistischen Ansatzes eine Alternative 
zu funktionalistischen Erklärungen der OMK dargestellt werden. Dabei lautet das Argument, dass 
die Mitte-Rechts-Koalition in Maastricht Regeln für die Haushalts- und Geldpolitik verabschiedete, 
die nachfolgende Regierungen binden würden. Die sozialdemokratische Mehrheit in Amsterdam 
einigte sich hingegen auf weiche Regeln in der Beschäftigungs- und Sozialpolitik, um den eigenen 
Handlungsspielraum nicht unnötig einzuengen. Während die Inhalte des Amsterdamer 
Beschäftigungstitels durch die Währungsunion bestimmt wurden, schuldet es seine Form – die 
OMK – dem Unwillen sozialdemokratischer Regierungen, Befugnisse an die EU abzugeben. 
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1. Introduction  
Over the last decade, a new policy-instrument has emerged within the European Union. Since the 
European Council summit at Lisbon, this new soft law procedure has been called the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC). It differs from the Community Method as it is more intergovernmentalist 
and neo-voluntaristic. What accounts for the European Union selecting less integrationist soft law in 
employment and social policy while relying on hard law in monetary and fiscal policy? Why has 
integration been uneven? This paper traces the paradox of the EU becoming a state in monetary 
policy while remaining an international organization in economic policy at large. More narrowly, it 
seeks to answer the question of why OMC was introduced to EU policy-making.  
This paper analyzes how European integration influences the subsequent policy-choices of national 
actors. To do so, I will rely on the historical institutionalist framework developed by Pierson (1996). 
He has argued that even though member states (in fact, governments) design European institutions in 
their own interests, these will thereafter not always conform to their expectations. Instead, 'gaps in 
control' emerge due to the partial autonomy of supranational institutions, restricted time horizons of 
political decision makers, unanticipated consequences, and shifts in governments' preferences. 
Supranational actors use these gaps in control to further their own interest and advance integration. 
In sum, there will be a ratchet-up effect of integration despite the efforts of national decision-makers 
to avoid sovereignty losses.  
While this account offers valuable insights to European integration, I nonetheless suggest a number 
of refinements that allow for a broader range of outcomes. First, governments can choose between 
different policy-instruments for cooperation. Not all of them lead to gaps in control. Instead, some of 
them - most notably the newly created Open Method of Coordination – are mainly built around 
intergovernmental cooperation. Second, governments know that some modes of governance are 
more likely to produce 'agency losses' than others.
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In particular, they learn to restrict the autonomy of supranational actors as a result of past 
experiences. Third, changing political majorities in the (European) Council can influence the choice 
of policies and policy-instruments. Hence, we have to look at how national governments align along 
party political lines. Overall, these amendments seem suited to explain how the decision for 
European Monetary Union influenced later policy-choices. To illustrate this argument, this paper 
provides a case study that reconstructs the sequence from Maastricht to Lisbon to demonstrate how 
prior integration in conjuncture with an altered political majority led to the choice of a soft law 
approach in employment policy – subsequently dubbed Open Method of Coordination.  
In the existing literature, the politics of choosing policy-instruments is oftentimes neglected. Most of 
the writing on the OMC focuses instead on its presumed effects. It is argued that soft law was 
selected as a problem-solving device that facilitates mutual learning and a diffusion of best practices 
(de la Porte/Pochet 2002: 12; Radaelli 2003: 52). Implicitly, it is assumed that policy-instruments are 
chosen on a functional logic. A historical institutionalist approach, in contrast, stresses how decisions 
are mediated and constrained by the already existing institutional setting (cf. Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 
2). Prior decisions have an impact on later ones. Hence, this paper contributes to the literature on the 
origins and the development of the OMC. It puts into question functional explanations and provides 
a historical institutionalist account instead.  
2. Conceptualizing Integration and Europeanization  
From a historical institutionalist view, there is a sequential relationship between integration and 
Europeanization where they impact on each other in the following way: At t1 a favorable actor 
constellation decides to push for integration, that is, to create "at the European level distinct 
structures of governance" (Risse/Cowles/Caporaso 2001: 3). The kind of institutions created and the 
mode of governance selected depend on the compromises struck between the actors involved. Once 
created, institutions are sticky because altering them depends on unanimous consent. Subsequently, 
at t2 the mode of governance impacts on national policy-making and restrict certain policies while 
enabling others (i.e., Europeanization). At t3 a new actor constellation might have emerged; 
however, in most cases, it cannot reverse the steps taken before and the room for maneuver 
decreases. Accordingly, the range of policy choices or available instruments becomes more limited 
at the end of the sequence. This three-step model was spelled out most forcefully by Pierson (1996).
(1) He sought to provide more realistic a framework for analyzing European integration than either 
intergovernmentalism or neo-functionalism. Taking into account the intergovernmentalist premise 
that in negotiations governments do not accept any compromise running counter to their interests, he 
then moved on to show why, over time, gaps between their institutional preferences and the actual 
functioning of institutions emerge nonetheless (ibid: 131). There are, according to Pierson, four 
reasons why they do: autonomous actions by supranational actors, restricted time horizons of 
decision makers, unintended consequences, and actors with different preferences taking office.  
Equally intriguing is the question why these control gaps cannot be undone by governments. If actors 
face unwanted consequences to prior decisions, why are they not able to alter them? There are three 
main reasons: the resistance of supranational actors, institutional obstacles to reform, and sunk costs 
(Pierson 1996: 142-145). European integration in particular empowers supranational actors. Over the 
years, the Commission has used its right of initiative to increase Community competencies.(2) The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also interpreted its mandate extensively. Supranational actors 
can make use of their powers to further expand their competencies. This phenomenon is known as 
'agency loss' in the literature on delegation: The principal always has difficulties in fully controlling 
the agent's actions (cf. Pollack 1997). 
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In brief, this analysis suggests a ratchet-up effect of European integration. Once decisions are taken, 
moves towards integration cannot easily be reversed. Consequently, at a later point in time, the 
options available become more limited. Pierson (1996: 147-148) believes that this account offers a 
better explanation for "task expansion" (Pollack 1994: 96) and ongoing integration than neo-
functionalism because it offers sound micro-foundations. His approach to historical institutionalism 
is both actor-centered and rationalist.(3)  
While I accept the thrust of Pierson's argument, I nevertheless propose some amendments to it. In 
particular three points deserve attention:  
1. not all policy-choices lead to a ratchet-up effect of integration;  
2. governments can choose forms of cooperation that limit agency losses;  
3. there is a political dimension to the choice of policy-instruments.  
While the next few paragraphs elaborate on these points, section three provides an empirical 
demonstration of the extended model in a case study. 
Three amendments 
First, the consequences – unintended or not – that follow from a decision for integration depend on 
the policy-instrument chosen. There is no need to assume they all have the same effects. Especially 
since different policy-instruments in varying degrees transfer power to supranational actors and can 
be more or less precise as well as binding. Abbott et al. (2000: 401) use delegation, precision, and 
obligation to analyze differences between soft and hard law. The loss of control for national 
governments depends on the specification of these three dimensions. Notably, delegation can trigger 
agency losses:  
"Legalized delegation, especially in its harder forms, introduces new actors and new 
forms of politics into interstate relations. […] actors with delegated legal authority have 
their own interests, the pursuit of which may be more or less successfully constrained by 
conditions on the grant of authority and concomitant surveillance by member states. 
Transnational coalitions of nonstate actors also pursue their interests through influence 
or direct participation at the supranational level, often producing greater divergence 
from member state concerns. Deciding disputes, adapting or developing new rules, 
implementing agreed norms, and responding to rule violations all engender their own 
type of politics, which helps to restructure traditional interstate politics" (Abbott et al. 
2000: 417). 
Obviously, the Community Method delegates considerable power to the Commission and the ECJ 
and offers ample opportunity to act independently of their principals. This mode of governance is 
characterized by the Commission monopoly of the right of initiative; a widespread use of qualified 
majority voting in the Council; an active role for the European Parliament; and the uniform 
interpretation of Community law by the European Court of Justice (Wallace 2000: 28-29). However, 
already the second and third pillars of the EU-Treaties circumscribe supranational actors' 
competencies. These pillars are based on an intergovernmental logic of cooperation in which the 
Commission's right of initiative is shared with the member states or limited to specific areas of 
activity; the Council generally acts unanimously; the European Parliament is confined to a purely 
consultative role; and the Court of Justice, if at all, plays only a minor role. Furthermore, and more 
importantly for this paper, the Open Method of Coordination also refrains from delegating authority. 
Its low degree of legalization makes it a soft law approach (Kenner 1999). Hence, there are 
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More generally, governments can choose between a range of different modes of coordination that 
differ with regard to delegation and, accordingly, the degree of legalization. Table 1 gives a number 
of examples of how modes of governance differ in terms of delegation and legalization. The choice 
of a 'softer' policy-instrument limits losses of control for national governments. The two extremes are 
pure competition on the one hand and complete integration (or supra-nationalization) on the other. 
Table 1 
A second point of departure from Pierson's model concerns the impact of unintended consequences 
on future decisions about policy-instruments. While it is true that the reversal of past decisions can 
be very difficult under unanimity rule, governments learn that certain instruments make unwanted 
consequences more likely than others. Once they have realized this, they might well opt for more 
intergovernmental forms of cooperation. Later sections of this paper will show that this has 
happened in the field of employment policy. More abstractly, this means that a sequence can be 
much longer than merely three steps which, in turn, necessitates studying longer periods of time – 
thus calling for an extended historical institutionalist account. If we prolong the time period under 
observation, we might realize that Pierson's three step model in fact is but a subsection of a longer 
sequence. Hence, there will be various lock-in, feedback, and learning effects that need examination.
(4) Not all of them will work in the same direction; in fact, they can conflict with and contradict each 
other. Obviously, Pierson is aware of this, yet his analysis primarily aims at explaining moves 
towards more integration. 
Thirdly, the kind of policy-instrument chosen depends on the beliefs and preferences of salient actors 
and, therefore, on actor constellations. That is to say, the choice of policy-instruments depends on 
politics. Even though Pierson refers to the British Conservative government's opt-out of the Social 
Protocol at Maastricht (for more details Lange 1993) and goes on to stress that a single Labour 
victory could reverse this decision, he fails to more generally consider the impact of the partisan 
composition of the European Council on policy-choices. However, had more governments shared the 
Conservative's position on social policy the Social Agreement would not have been possible. Instead, 
Christian democratic parties strongly influenced the IGC that strove for flanking market-making with 
some – limited – social policy (see Johansson 2002). Similarly, had the 1980s been dominated by 
center-left governments rather than the New Right, the Single European Act would either have not 
occurred or looked differently. In general, it seems important to take the party affiliation of 
negotiating governments into account. 
This last point is particularly important if Hix and Lord's (1997: 4) assertion holds that  
"key players rush to form agreements while there is a favorable conjuncture in the 
domestic politics of member states. They may also seek to neutralize future uncertainties 
in national party politics by locking successor governments into EU-level agreements."  
In this case, the partisan composition of the European Council matters a great deal and deserves 
attention. The next section shows that a center-right coalition opted for hard law in monetary and 
fiscal policy at Maastricht, while a center-left coalition relied on soft law for employment policy at 
Amsterdam. Both timing and politics matter in the choice of policy-instruments. 
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3. From EMU to OMC: A Historical Institutionalist Account  
This section provides a case study that uses the amended Pierson model to explain a specific feature 
of the EU's political economy: Why Maastricht created hard law for monetary and fiscal policy, 
while Amsterdam relied on soft law for employment policy. I would argue that we cannot understand 
these different degrees of integration and Europeanization without looking at over time changing 
actor constellations, learning, and politics. To show how actor constellations vary, this paper uses a 
data-set on the party composition of government in all member states. We observe a large variation 
in the number of center-right and center-left governments between 1991 and 2003. Based on this 
observation, the case study reveals this sequence: A market enhancing actor constellation (t1) 
fostered integration following a macroeconomic design demanding 'hard coordination' for monetary 
and fiscal policy (t2), which on the one hand had strong effects on national policy-making (t3) and 
on the other limited subsequent policy choices. Accordingly, between 1997 and 2001, the social 
democratic majority in place merely created a subsidiary employment policy, supplementing market 
integration. Today, the main focus of social policy and social inclusion is 'commodification,' i.e., 
including as many people as possible into the labor market.(5) As an illustration, we can depict the 
relation between integration and Europeanization in the following way: 
Table 2 
3.1. European Monetary Union  
This section deals with the first part of the sequence shown in table 2. It seeks to show how the 
conservative-liberal coalition facilitated an agreement on EMU. Governments in Maastricht agreed 
upon 'integration' as the mode of governance for monetary policy. By transferring the decision-
making power to the European Central Bank, they chose to even surpass the Community Method. 
Therefore, not only the impact on national policy-making has been strong but also the room for 
maneuver for later actors has severely been limited. 
This paper does not claim, however, that party politics was the only factor bringing about EMU. The 
Maastricht Treaty came at a time when the political landscape of Europe was rapidly changing due to 
the end of the Cold War. It could also build on a relatively high degree of economic convergence 
between the member states and pre-established forms of monetary cooperation. Yet, the conclusions 
actors draw from such developments depend on who these actors are. The dominance of market-
oriented governments clearly had an impact first on the integration project chosen and second on its 
institutional design. 
Therefore, to understand the peculiar political economy of the European Union, we have to begin 
with the Maastricht decision to form a Monetary Union. It entails the creation of an independent 
central bank and a set of rules for fiscal policy. Owing to this, EMU is strong on delegation, 
obligation, and precision and strongly influences national policies. Why was it possible after more 
than 20 years of discussions to agree on EMU? Two aspects in particular seem important. First, an 
expert consensus about the design of a monetary union existed at the time of the negotiations. 
Second, a favorable actor constellation built up supporting these expert's ideas. Ideational 
convergence met with political power to create EMU.(6) 
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An expert consensus was possible because a small circle of Ministers of Finance and Central 
Bankers negotiated the framework for EMU. This took place in the Committee of Central Bankers, 
the Monetary Committee and the Delors' Committee. The participants formed an "epistemic 
community" (Haas 1992) that mainly concentrated on the problem of how to secure price stability in 
a monetary union. This narrow focus also led to a narrow definition of the institutional requirements. 
Members of the Committees came to share the view that an independent central bank built on the 
German example would ensure sound money. As the German Bundesbank was involved in these 
discussions, its later approval was facilitated. This, in turn, helped the government to domestically 
justify giving up the D-Mark (Moravcsik 1998: 395). 
The evolving monetarist consensus meant abandoning earlier proposals for a monetary union. Both 
the Werner Plan (1970) and the MacDougall Report (1977) had stressed the need for centralizing 
decisions on fiscal policy and increasing the Community budget (Tsoukalis 1993: 275); centralizing 
monetary policy without centralizing economic policy decisions was inconceivable at that time. 
Once Keynesian thinking had been abandoned, stabilizing aggregate demand for the entire 
Community became less salient. Instead, fiscal policy came to be seen mainly as a means supporting 
price stability. Accordingly, the Delors' Committee suggested defining a limit to national budgets. 
EMU could only work if national deficits and debts were controlled by a clear set of binding rules. In 
contrast, the overall policy-mix was to be achieved by a soft coordination of national policies. 
Gouvernement économique – i.e., centralized economic policy-making – did not seem necessary any 
longer. 
Limiting transfers of sovereignty exclusively to monetary policy not only made for an institutionally 
lean concept of EMU but also facilitated agreement (Schröder 1998: 186). During the 1980s, due to 
the European Monetary System most governments had already lost their monetary autonomy as they 
followed the low inflation policy of the Bundesbank. Thus, they could even hope to gain influence 
by transferring monetary authority to a joint central bank (cf. Sandholtz 1993: 37-38). Germany, on 
the other hand, was the one state that had to abdicate power. This strengthened its bargaining 
position. All other governments had to agree to a version of EMU that could find the support of the 
German government as well as the Bundesbank. Modeling the new European central bank on its 
German predecessor eased that problem. As Radaelli (2000: 30) points out, the provisions on EMU 
are a case in point of "institutional isomorphism." 
Exactly how important German unification in this process was is disputed. Moravcsik (1998: 428) 
denies that the fall of the Berlin Wall made any difference since the German negotiation position did 
not change between 1988 and the Maastricht summit. Dyson and Featherstone (1999: 757), in 
contrast, argue that German unification gave a sense of urgency primarily to French policy-makers to 
conclude the negotiations on EMU. It seems fair to say that the changed geopolitical situation 
speeded up negotiations that otherwise might have been inconclusive (see Sandholtz 1993: 31-34).
(7) 
In sum, an expert consensus on monetary union, the demand for only limited transfers of sovereignty 
along with German unification gave impetus to creating EMU. These were necessary conditions, 
though; by themselves, they did not suffice. Only the overwhelming majority of center-right 
governments paved the way to EMU. In 1991, only two out of twelve member states were governed 
by the left. One of them was France that actively supported further steps in European integration. In 
the other countries, center-right parties were in government that followed a program of liberalization 
and fiscal austerity. In particular Christian democratic parties supportive of further integration 
decisively shaped the negotiations (Johansson 2002). For center-right parties, EMU was a way to 
permanently enshrine price stability in a European framework. 
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They also saw the opportunity to discipline their successors (much in Hix and Lord's sense) and to 
add legitimacy to their national course of action: "Pivotal to the process of using EMU to 'bind 
Leviathan' was the structural power of Germany over European monetary policy and the political 
ascendancy of a Christian-democratic-liberal coalition under Chancellor Helmut Kohl dedicated to a 
strict version of 'ordo-liberal' theory" (Dyson 1999: 200). In short, at t1 of the sequence, center-right 
governments seized the opportunity to adopt hard law to bolster EMU and created an autonomous 
central bank committed to price stability. They turned their policy-preference into hard law that 
subsequently could not easily be undone. 
What does this mean for the concept of integration and Europeanization presented earlier? 
Monetary policy is quite exceptional to EU policy-making in precluding any influence of the 
member states' governments and parliaments. In contrast, even the Community Method does not 
work without the cooperation of national authorities. Moreover, with the ECB an independent actor 
was created whose mandate can only be changed by unanimous consent. Even if governments 
wanted to pursue a different course of action, they would be inhibited by the institutional framework 
created in Maastricht.(8) The European Central Bank has the power to retaliate against any attempt 
to instigate growth by a less restrictive fiscal policy. Due to the priority given to price stability, 
monetary policy cannot be employed to strengthen growth. In fact, insolating the ECB from demands 
for a growth-inducing policy-mix signals that it pursues a "dominant strategy" (cf. 
Bernhard/Broz/Clark 2002: 706). There is no need for an ex ante coordination of policies because it 
is assumed that all other actors will have to adapt to the central bank's strategy. Hence, Issing (2002: 
348) points out that the Maastricht Treaty provides an 'efficient initial assignment' rendering other 
forms of coordination superfluous. In contrast, von Hagen and Mundschenk (2001) are more critical 
of whether this institutional setting in itself produces positive outcomes. Be that as it may, the critical 
point is that in monetary policy there is strong legalization and accordingly economic policy is 
locked-in to a monetarist path. 
The resulting impact (i.e., Europeanization) of EMU on national policy-making is also strong. It 
forestalls the use of exchange rate changes or fiscal stimuli during crises and, in combination with 
the single market, considerably increases competition; member states have few instruments at their 
disposal to react to asymmetrical shocks or low growth; as labor mobility across borders remains 
marginal, the need for domestic labor market flexibility mounts; price competition is heightened and 
there is a strong pressure to reduce 'slack,' i.e., subsidized or sheltered unproductive jobs. As a result, 
the options for a European employment policy have been markedly reduced by EMU and the SGP's 
rules for fiscal policy. As Scharpf (2002: 11) stresses, a number of traditionally available strategies 
are beyond the scope of such an initiative: 
"Thus if unemployment rise in the Euro Zone generally, Luxembourg EES guidelines 
could not recommend lower ECB interest rates; if unemployment rates rises nationally, 
EES recommendations could neither relax the deficit rules of the Stability Pact nor the 
competition rules on state aids to depressed regions or industries. Similarly if 
expenditures on health care are rising, OMC could not recommend controls or "positive 
lists" for pharmaceuticals; and if social services are being eroded by fiscal constraints, 
there is no chance for guidelines promoting either a concerted increase of taxes on 
capital incomes of failing that, the re-introduction of effective capital exchange 
controls." 
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Prior integration explains why the European employment strategy is limited in its contents. It was 
both a supplement and subordinated to EMU. Any more ambitious, employment-creating initiatives 
were circumscribed by the importance attached to sound money and the credibility of maintaining 
price stability. Therefore, employment policy was residual in character. On this account, Pierson's 
three-step historical institutionalist model holds for the first part of the sequence of table 2. Yet, 
employment was not only limited to supply-side measures but also confined to soft law. Why was a 
non-binding, soft mode of coordination chosen? The next section addresses this question. It deals 
with the second part of the sequence in table 2. 
3.2. The Origins of the Open Method of Coordination  
In the aftermath of the Maastricht summit, European integration faced a legitimacy crisis. Danish 
voters in 1992 rejected the Treaty amendments in a referendum while the French accepted them only 
by a tiny majority. At the same time, the European economy turned sore and unemployment rose 
again. There was a widespread notion that integration was too exclusively focused on market 
integration, disregarding unemployment as the most pressing problem (cf. Deppe/Felder 1993). The 
permissive consensus supporting integration was at risk. In this moment of crisis action had to be 
taken to prove that governments cared for unemployment without, however, granting more power to 
distant 'Brussels bureaucrats.' 
At the Copenhagen summit in 1993, the European Council instructed the Commission to produce a 
White Paper. It was asked to spell out a strategy for higher growth, competitiveness and 
employment. The Commission's report became known as the 'Delors' White Book.' However, the 
first real step towards a European employment initiative came with the Essen summit in 1994.(9) 
Heads of state and government agreed on a number of objectives to fight unemployment (European 
Council 1994). These included investing in human capital (up-skilling of the workforce), increasing 
the employment-intensiveness of growth, reducing non-wage labor costs, improving the 
effectiveness of employment policy by moving from passive to active labor market policy as well as 
supporting groups particularly hard hit by unemployment. An important role was also conferred to 
social partner dialogue. (10) 
Crucially, however, none of these objectives was legally binding or enforceable. Those governments 
most skeptical of a European employment policy knew that a binding agreement would make for 
unduly Commission interference in domestic policy-making. Accordingly, they fought for a soft law 
approach. As a result, member states were merely urged "to transpose these recommendations in 
their individual policies into a multi-annual program having regard to the specific features of their 
economic and social situation" (European Council 1994). The European Commission and the Labor 
and Social Affairs as well as Economic Financial Affairs Council were asked to monitor national 
developments and report annually to the European Council about their progress. Hence, the core 
elements of the Open Method of Coordination – common objectives, national implementation and 
surveillance by the Commission and member states – were in place already in 1994. Content and 
form followed from a disagreement in substance and a consensus to limit obligation. A soft 
coordination padded with mutual monitoring served both. 
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Another parent of the OMC was the convergence process introduced with the Maastricht Treaty 
(Pochet/de la Porte/Room 2001: 295). Member states drew up a set of criteria defining eligibility for 
entering monetary union. Again, it was up to each individual government to determine by which 
means it wanted to meet these goals. There was a yearly assessment of the achievements in so-called 
convergence reports. The convergence process did not depend on any (negative) sanctions because 
compliance promised club membership. It was a soft coordination mechanism in that compliance 
could not be enforced, though it entailed strong incentives to meet the terms. Even though no one 
doubted that several states had taken great pains to meet the Maastricht criteria and that a fair level 
of convergence had been achieved, the decision of which member states were eligible for monetary 
union was a political one. 
During the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Amsterdam Treaty those governments 
supporting a chapter on employment could point towards already agreed upon principles for 
employment policy as well as a successful method. Especially those countries that had joined the 
Union only in 1995 – Sweden, Finland, Austria – supported a higher EU profile in tackling 
unemployment as long as it did not jeopardize subsidiarity. Still, until early 1997 chances that the 
negotiations would lead to an agreement were slim as conservative governments in Great Britain, 
France, and Germany opposed even this limited approach. Only after the elections in the first two 
countries, which brought New Labour and the French socialists to power, an agreement became 
possible (Szyszczak 2000: 204). Finally not even the Kohl government was keen on blocking treaty 
reform for an issue considered of minor relevance. It wanted to make sure, though, that any transfer 
of power to the European Commission would be strictly limited. In the end, employment became 
part of the Amsterdam Treaty.(11) Without the leftward electoral swing in Europe this would not 
have happened (Jenson/Pochet 2002: 8). 
In an article on the genesis and the development of the European Employment Strategy, Goetschy 
(1999: 125) offers a similar conclusion: 
"Consensus in the [Amsterdam] IGC over employment was only possible on two 
conditions: national employment policies should continue to play the principal role, and 
major and costly programmes at EU level should be avoided. Some parties (ETUC, the 
EP and some national delegations) would have preferred the Treaty to have formally 
specified the relationship between economic and employment policies. Instead the 
desire to bring the two into balance was declared in a formal Council resolution (albeit 
without binding effect) on growth and employment. The inequality of status between the 
mandatory Stability and Growth Pact agreed at the December 1996 Dublin summit and 
the resolution on employment illustrates the continuing imbalance between monetary 
and political integration." 
Since the amended Treaty would only be ratified in 1999, governments decided to have a special 
summit on employment in 1997. Because it took place in Luxembourg, the European Employment 
Strategy was baptized 'Luxembourg process.' Consciously modeled on the Maastricht convergence 
process, the employment chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the following cycle: 
1. every year, members states would agree on Employment Guidelines specifying common 
objectives;  
2. each governments would draw up a National Employment Action Plan (NAP) detailing the 
strategy of how it would seek to achieve these goals;  
3. based on a Commission draft, the Council and the Commission would publish the Joint 
Employment Report which would assess and evaluate member states' NAPs as well as their 
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While this procedure mimicked the convergence program, it refrained from introducing sanctions (de 
la Porte/Pochet 2001: 295). The Luxembourg process tried to compensate for its limited legal weight 
by putting a stronger emphasis on the commitment made by governments. They were asked to draw 
up a NAP to detail their approach to fighting unemployment. This document could be used thereafter 
to compare word and action. This Commission hoped to gain influence on national policies by 
reminding reluctant governments on their prior commitment. 
At the Luxembourg summit, no consensus could be reached on defining a target for unemployment 
as a counterpart to those concerning public deficits, inflation, and debts (Rodrigues 2001: 4). The 
Commission proposed a more rigorous set of employment guidelines and urged the member states to 
accept clearly specified quantitative targets but could not overcome their resistance (Biagi 2000: 57). 
That they affected a compromise at all was largely due to the negotiation skills and personality of 
Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg's prime minister.(12) Juncker, a Christian Democrat, convinced 
his colleagues that some action was necessary. Reducing employment policies to a voluntary 
opportunity for learning without obligatory targets facilitated support for it (Trubek/Mosher 2003: 
38). In the end, such diverse governments as those led by Jospin, Blair, Aznar and Kohl were able to 
accede to the thus conceived European Employment Strategy (EES). 
There are two reasons why the EES did not turn out to be a stillborn child. The European 
Commission and the newly created Employment Committee used their influence to upgrade the 
process to push for quantitative indicators, rigorous benchmarking and made increasing use of 
'naming and shaming' by implicitly ranking member states' performances. During 1999 and 2000 two 
cycles of the Luxembourg Process were completed. National governments and administrations got 
used to drawing up Action Plans and even learned to accept yearly recommendations. Moreover, in 
2000 the economic outlook was favorable. The Commission's forecast predicted GDP growth of 
about three per cent for 2001 and 2002 and a decline in unemployment to a twenty-year low of under 
eight per cent in 2002 (European Commission 2000: 33-37). Hence, the EES had gained credit for 
being a smoothly working policy tool. 
Second, and more importantly, since Maastricht the actor constellation had changed. Europe was 
now governed by social democrats (see Figure 1 and 2). In 1997, for the first time in the 1990s, a 
majority of governments were led by the left, a development that peaked in 1999 when eleven out of 
fifteen governments were headed by social democrats. Since then, this number has declined 
considerably to currently only four out of EU-15. Thus, between 1998 and 2001 a supportive 
coalition for the EES existed, not only solidifying but even strengthening it. These governments were 
– at least principally – committed to welfare state reform, turning "vices into virtues" (Levy 1999). 
The European Employment Strategy gave them a common vocabulary as well as a European 
complement to their national endeavors. Yet, the "magical return of Social 
Democracy" (Cuperus/Kandel 1998) brought the New Left to power, most prominently, New Labour 
in Britain. These modernized social democrats were far less interventionist than their predecessors 
and had come to accept the market. Hence, the EES of the Amsterdam Treaty "most closely reflects 
the new centre-left programme of Tony Blair, which seems likely to dominate the Union's social 
agenda in the years to come" (Pollack 2000: 269). When the Left faced the opportunity – though, 
within limits – to transform the EU-agenda, it had itself been transformed. 
Figure 1
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Figure 2 
Under the Portuguese presidency, the soft method of coordination used in employment became 
generally accepted as combining Community action with subsidiarity, thus reconciling effectiveness 
and legitimacy. The Portuguese government, led by the Social Democrat Antonio Guterres, 
advocated transforming the procedures probed with the Employment Strategy – European guidelines, 
NAPs, peer review, and peer pressure – into a policy-making tool of its own right (Hodson/Maher 
2001: 724). At the Lisbon summit in March 2000, the EES-approach, dubbed the Open Method of 
Coordination, was defined by: 
z "fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals 
which they set in the short, medium and long terms;  
z establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against 
the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a 
means of comparing best practice;  
z translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific 
targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences;  
z periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning 
processes" (European Council 2000: §37).  
At the same summit, heads of state and government created the 'Lisbon strategy.' They agreed to a 
new strategic goal for the next decade: "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion" (European Council 2000: §5). The strategy aimed at full employment and 
thereby strengthening social cohesion. The Council suggested that the overall goal should be raising 
the EU employment rate to 70% and to increase the number of women in employment to more than 
60% by 2010. Today, after four years the European Union falls far short of the Lisbon goals and is in 
danger of missing them altogether. At its latest summit, the European Council concluded that "the 
pace of reform needs to be significantly stepped up if the 2010 goals targets are to be 
achieved" (European Council 2004: §7). Somewhat schizophrenically, the member states demanded 
improved implementation and a speedier translation of the goals into concrete measures (ibid: §10) - 
as if someone else was responsible for their own inaction. 
This gap between solemn declarations and real actions points towards an explanation of OMC's 
attractiveness for governments. It is a neo-voluntarist, soft mode of governance that:(13) 
z allows for flexibility (policy initiatives can be adapted to the diverse institutional 
arrangements, legal regimes and national circumstances in the member states);  
z minimizes sovereignty losses (member-states compliance remains essentially voluntary. 
Compliance is not enforceable  
z helps superseding political resistance (flexible agreements may overcome member states' 
opposition to EU mandates considered too disruptive or too alien to national arrangements);  
z permits shifting blame (it enables domestic actors to blame the EU for unpopular decisions);  
z offers symbolic politics (new initiatives foster the impression of determination. European 
governments jointly take action against unemployment, social exclusion, and for economic 
growth);  
z avoids agency losses (member states stay firmly in control of politics. Rather than enabling 
supranational actors to follow their own agenda [principal-agent problem], member states use 
the Open Method to shield them from outside interference – unless it turns out to be useful for 
their own domestic aims. An internationalization of domestic decisions strengthens executive 
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Whereas EMU and prior integration largely explain the limits in substance of the Open Method of 
Coordination, its form is due to these general features of soft law. Although developed 
incrementally, it has proved a useful tool for intergovernmental cooperation beyond the Community 
Method. Governments have willingly applied it to new fields.(14) The OMC has not replaced the 
Community Method but it has widened the menu member states can choose from. Governments rely 
on it when they favor common action though remain anxious not to lose control (Dehousse 2002). 
Arguably, governments have learned to avoid instruments which threaten to incur lasting agency 
losses. 
If we look at the origins of the OMC, four points deserve attention. 
First, neither EES nor OMC call into question the predominance of the European Monetary Union. 
They are not meant to challenge the logic put forward in the Maastricht Treaty but instead to 
supplement it. Lisbon cannot be considered "Europe's Maastricht for welfare" (Rhodes 2000) as the 
institutionalization remains much weaker. Both delegation and obligation are extremely low for 
various OMC-procedures. 
Second, since it was inaugurated in 1994, employment policy has relied on a voluntarist and 
intergovernmental coordination procedure. There has never been as strong a coalition in favor of 
internationalizing employment policy as there was in Maastricht for monetary policy. Whereas 
center-right governments accepted to impose strict rules for fiscal policy also on themselves to lock-
in their successors, social democratic governments were reluctant to transfer power and, thus, to 
create equally binding rules for employment policy. They instead favored more intergovernmental 
modes of cooperation. As demonstrated elsewhere, the level of support for European integration – 
enhanced supranational competencies – systematically co-varies with shifting political majorities. 
While the Christian democrat-liberal coalition at Maastricht scored high on integration-mindedness, 
support for further transfers of power subsequently plummeted with the ascending social democratic 
majority (Manow/Schäfer/Zorn 2004). Moreover, the left was afraid that the credit for fighting 
unemployment – an electoral asset for center-left parties – would then go to the EU (Ladrech 2003: 
119). 
Third, the European Employment Strategy was created during the run-up to EMU. Any radical 
departure from the Maastricht framework would have jeopardized successfully launching monetary 
union – a goal that most center-left parties shared. Moreover, the institutions created earlier, most 
notably the European Central Bank and the SGP, enshrined a macroeconomic logic that precluded 
utilizing monetary policy or fiscal policy for fostering growth. The 'initial assignment' puts pressure 
on labor market liberalization and wage policy as the way towards accelerated growth (cf. Begg 
2002: 6-7). Monetary and fiscal policies, on the other hand, respectively have to secure price stability 
and signal a clear commitment to responsible government action. 
Fourth, across sectors, integration does not automatically lead towards further integration. Quite 
contrary to the neo-functionalist logic of spillover, the far-reaching integration in monetary policy 
might have prevented a stronger form of economic coordination or a more meaningful employment 
policy. We only detect this kind of feedback mechanism by looking at the longer sequence since 
Maastricht. 
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While the preponderance of EMU explains the contents of the EES, governments' reluctance to 
transferring power accounts for its form, that is, for why soft law was chosen. The OMC was 
selected to limit both integration and Europeanization; it was the attempt of social democratic 
governments – who inherited institutions built by their center-right predecessors – to craft a social 
policy onto the exiting framework without unduly restricting their own room for maneuver. 
4. Conclusion  
This paper has argued that taking into account a longer time-sequence helps to better understand 
both form and content of the European Employment Strategy. To explain the origins of the Open 
Method of Coordination it thus seems promising to go back to earlier decisions taken at Maastricht. 
Converging economic ideas and a supportive actor constellation rendered possible an agreement on 
EMU. Restricting transfers of sovereignty to monetary policy facilitated this agreement. Moreover, 
the decision to model the ECB on the Bundesbank secured German consent. The Maastricht Treaty 
led to far-reaching albeit narrow integration built on hard law. Whereas monetary policy was 
centralized and a set of rules devised for fiscal policy, all other fields of economic policy-making 
rested with the national level (Cameron 1998: 213). However, multilateral surveillance – a soft 
coordination procedure – was introduced for aligning national decisions. As EMU was based on the 
monetarist paradigm, the institutional framework created with Maastricht firmly entrenched supply-
side policies. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, center-left governments came to office pushing to advance 
employment policy at the European level. However, due to prior integration available options were 
limited. Without putting EMU into question, employment policy could only focus on labor market 
reform. Furthermore, the Employment Title of the Amsterdam Treaty was only acceptable to all 
governments because it refrained from delegating decision-making competencies. Reluctant 
governments made sure that there would not be any strong outside interference with national 
decisions. Soft law was a means to reconcile a common approach with the national prerogative for 
action. Yet, contrary to harder – legally binding – modes of governance, the OMC does not create 
the kind of lock-in that Pierson detected as a mechanism that propels integration. At Maastricht, the 
British Conservatives had to opt-out of the Social Protocol to avoid its consequences. After 
Amsterdam, this is no longer necessary since soft law does not bind reluctant governments in the 
first place. 
Combining European guidelines, national decisions and multilateral discussions became a new 
policy instrument called the Open Method of Coordination at Lisbon. It has been extended to more 
than ten other policy areas since then. A nonbinding form of cooperation makes it easier to find 
compromises and seems particularly advantageous to governments as it widens their strategic room 
for maneuver. Accordingly, the OMC became a way of cooperating beyond the traditional 
Community Method. 
To conclude, I would like to draw attention to three theoretical points. First, there is no inherent 
dynamic leading to ever more integration. While past decisions sometimes become irreversible, this 
is not always the case. For example, the OMC is presently applied to a whole range of policy-fields 
without a legal base in the EU-Treaties. Cooperation is voluntary and can be withdrawn. This leads 
to a second, closely related observation: Not all policy-instruments lead to agency losses. Especially 
the OMC avoids transferring power to supranational actors. Soft law cannot oblige governments to 
comply. In fact, this paper has argued that governments support the OMC because of its low degree 
of legalization and its limited potential for unintended consequences. Third, Pierson's main source 
for preference change – changing governments – has to be taken seriously and, accordingly, more 
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systematically differ in their support for integration (Marks/Wilson/Ray 2002; Manow/Schäfer/Zorn 
2004) but also favor different policies. While left parties tend to support European social policy and, 
more generally, regulated capitalism (Hooghe/Marks/Wilson 2004: 129-130), they are on average 
also less integration-minded than their Christian democratic counterparts. Hence, I argue that 
different political majorities at Maastricht and Amsterdam are an important variable that helps to 
explain why EMU is built on hard law and employment policy on soft law. 
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(*) This paper resulted from several workshops of the European Research Colloquium funded by the 
Netherlands Institute of Government. I would like to thank the organizers, Ron Holzhacker and 
Markus Haverland, for their advice and support. Moreover, I benefited a lot from the discussions 
with the other participants and, especially, from Femke van Esch's suggestions. Finally, I would like 
to thank two anonymous reviewers for very useful comments. 
(1) Cf. Hix's (1998: 47) summary. 
(2) Rhodes (1995: 99-104) refers to this as the 'treaty-base game'. 
(3) Usually, three institutionalisms are juxtaposed: sociological, rational choice, and historical 
institutionalism (cf. Hall/Taylor 1996). However, the first two can both lead to the lock-in that the 
last usually stresses; hence, there can well be either a sociological historical institutionalism OR a 
rationalist historical institutionalism. Thelen (1999) provides a discussion of the relationship of the 
three variants. Since this paper relies mainly on Pierson's rationalist variant of historical 
institutionalism, it neglects socialization and long-term learning effects, i.e., endogenous preference 
changes. Instead, due to the limited period under observation and space restrictions, in this paper 
changes in preferences result exogenously from changing actors. 
(4) Historical institutionalism and especially arguments about path-dependency always face the 
difficulty to delimit the beginning and the end of a path. The very time segment studied can 
influence the estimation of the causal effect. Unless we have a theory about the forces that sustain 
(and end) a path, it is hard to repel the claim that any particular path actually started even earlier than 
maintained. While this is an important problem that deserves attention, this brief paper can by no 
means do justice to it. Note, however, that the approach here chosen could well be extended further 
into the past or, at a later point of time, into the future. 
(5) 'While the term 'Social Europe' accentuates the social goals behind the strategy, these goals are 
almost exclusively approached from the direction of employment. The underlying message is that the 
social value of an individual is primarily determined by his/her potential contribution as a worker. 
The overarching operational aim is to get those able to work working and those unable to work 
enabled' (Hvinden/Heikkilä/Kankare 2001: 174). 
(6) Dyson and Featherstone (1999) provide a detailed account of the developments leading to the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
(7) To mollify France's concerns, the German government agreed to a precise schedule towards 
monetary union. Earlier, any definite time-table had been rejected with the argument that prior 
economic convergence would have to occur. This so-called 'coronation theory' had traditionally been 
opposed by the French view that monetary cooperation would trigger economic convergence 
('locomotive theory') (Kruse 1980: 62-70; Tsoukalis 1993: 178). The will to come to an agreement in 
Maastricht bridged these seemingly contradictory strategies: While the start of EMU was fixed for 
1999, only those states that until then would have achieved a sufficient degree of convergence should 
partake. Hence, the Maastricht Treaty spelled out a number of convergence criteria as a precondition 
for participation. 
(8) This poses serious questions for the democratic legitimacy of ECB's decisions. Cf. Scharpf 
(1999: 155). 
(9) As a matter fact, the Essen Employment procedures were meant to fend-off more ambitious 
proposals of the ascending social democratic majority in the European Council (Hix/Lord 1997: 
194). 
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23.09.2004 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-013.htm(10) These objectives until today are at the heart of the European Employment Strategy 
(11) A detailed reconstruction of the negotiation process and the positions of relevant actors can be 
found in Tidow (1998). 
(12) The crucial role Juncker had played was confirmed frequently in interviews the author 
conducted with Commission and national officials as well as ETUC representatives. 
(13)The following draws on Abbott and Snidal (2000: 436-443). 
(14) For an overview see Hodson and Maher (2001: 726). 
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Menu of EU Modes of Governance 
 
Table II 
Sequence of Integration and Europeanization 
 
 
actor constel- 
lation  
t1 
integration 
 
 
t2 
Europeani-
zation  
t3 
resulting
regulation
monetary and 
 
fiscal policy 
conservative- 
liberal coalition strong strong EMU: 
hard law
t4 t5 t6
employment  
and social  
policy
social democratic 
 
coalition
weak weak OMC: 
soft law
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Governments dominated by the left in percentage* 
 
*Based on a data-set of Schmidt et al. (2003). 2003: own data. For 1997 and 2000 the data refer to the time of the 
Amsterdam and Lisbon summit respectively. Numbers in graph 1 refer to the percentage of ministers of the left 
(Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats and Greens) and the right (Christian Democrats, Centrists, Conservatives, 
Liberals and the non-regionalist Right). Others refers to ministers or prime ministers without party affiliation; in graph 2 
these mainly are technocratic governments in Italy. 
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Governments led by prime minister of the left in percentage 
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